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Introductory remarks 
Since the 1990s cultural and social anthropology in Africa have increasingly 
dealt with themes and theoretical issues which focus on the legacy of the colo-
nial past for present day societies. For this current debate scholars commonly 
employ the label ߋpostcolonialismߌ or ߋpostcolonial studiesߌ. Generally, three 
different approaches are subsumed under this label: first, a description of insti-
tutional conditions in formerly colonial societies, second, an abstract, critical 
view of the global condition after the end of the colonial period, and third, an 
analysis of discourses informed by the epistemological and psychological ori-
entations which are products of those conditions1. It is obvious that in this 
particular context emphasis is to be laid on the last mentioned approach. 
With regard to Ethiopia one has to state first of all that the country was 
subjected by a European colonial power, Italy, for less than six years be-
tween 1935 und 1941. This occupation was therefore marginal and conse-
quently does not play an important part in the mainstream discussion on 
post-colonial issues. Interest in Italian colonialism has concentrated on se-
lective topics: the endeavour of revenging the blemish of the defeat at 
ʞAdwa (1896), international diplomacy, ideological positions, political and 
military dimensions of the war and the cruelties of Fascist rule, particularly 
those committed in the heartlands of Christian Ethiopia. The time of the 
Italian occupation was characterized by incessant warfare which was hardly 
documented apart from the ߋofficialߌ fronts of the Ethiopian and Italian 
armies, however. Ethnographers of the 1950s in southern Ethiopia, such as 
Adolf Jensen, Eike Haberland and Helmut Straube, came to know many 
details of events during the Italian rule and they openly spoke of them in 
private discussion. But because of their focus on culture history, they rarely 
considered data on the recent past as worth publishing. It was not before 
the 1980s that researchers, for example Hermann Amborn, Dirk Bustorf 
and myself, became increasingly involved in documenting the oral history 
 
* This article is based on a paper presented at the 17th International Conference of Ethi-
opian Studies in Addis AbÃba on November 3, 2009. 
1 Cf. VIVESVAN 1996: 988. 
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of southern Ethiopia in which ߋwar and remembranceߌ is a theme of partic-
ular interest in the context of Italian colonial warfare.2 
Despite its brief duration, the Italian occupation nevertheless affected the 
socio-economic patterns and practices of people in many parts of Ethiopia. 
As the historian Bahru Zewde has convincingly stated, a proper assessment 
of the historical significance of the time between 1935 and 1941 is still pend-
ing: ߋߑ it is quite evident that the Italian legacy cannot be merely sub-
sumed, as has been the custom, under road-building and prostitutionߌ.3 So 
far neither the oral traditions nor the archival records seem to have been 
exhaustively examined and evaluated. 
The centre of my own interest is central-southern Ethiopia, where I col-
lected oral data from the early 1970s onwards particularly among Hadiyya, 
Kambaata, Gurage, Allaaba, Sidaama and Arsi-Oromo and interpreted them 
in the context of information provided by written sources. Historical facts 
from other areas such as KÃfa, Gamo Gofa and Ogaden are desirable in order 
to complete the state of knowledge on Italian colonialism from the emic per-
spective of Ethiopian people. The data presented here reveal collaboration 
with as well as resistance against the foreign rulers. But although these revela-
tions prove to be a highly sensitive issue, provoking controversial views and 
emotions even several decades after the events, it seems to be due time now to 
discuss the details in a decidedly unbiased scholarly approach. 
The periodization of Italian colonialism can roughly be subdivided into 
three phases: first, the period of military conquest (1935߃37), second, the 
time of more or less consolidated rule (1937߃41), and third, the collapse and 
the retreat of the foreign occupants (1941). In the following, I will give a 
brief outline of all three phases. 
The period of military occupation (1935߃37)  
Italy߈s invasion of Ethiopia started on October 3, 1935, and according to an 
official declaration the occupation was accomplished on May 9, 1936, after 
the Italian armies of the Eritrean and the Somali front had met at DƼrre 
Dawa.4 However, by this time hardly more than one third of Ethiopia߈s 
 
2 Relevant data regarding this type of ߋhistory from belowߌ were composed, for exam-
ple, by AMBORN 1988: 751߃61; AMBORN 2009: 28, 34, 286; BRAUK£MPER 1980, chap-
ters 3.8.1,3.8.2; BRAUK£MPER 1983, chapter 2.9; BUSTORF 2009, chapter 7.3; BUSTORF 
2010. For the methodology cf. WINTER ߃ SIVAN 1999. 
3 BAHRU ZEWDE 1988: 277. 
4 For the chronology of the war cf. DEL BOCA 1969; SBACCHI 1985; OFCANSKY 2007. A 
new state of research on Italian atrocities in Ethiopia was presented by ASFA-WOSSEN 
ASSERATE ߃ MATTIOLI (eds.) 2006. 
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territory had really been conquered. The fierce fighting in the central-
southern parts of the country did not end before the surrender and execu-
tion of ras DÃsta DÃmؾaw at Butaǆira, Gurage Province, on February 24, 
1937.5 
In the areas south of ĿÃwa, occupied by emperor Mȸnilȸk II during the 
last quarter of the 19th century, ׶abÃŀa conquerors, i.e. Christian Amhara 
and to a lesser extent Tȸgray and Tuulama-Oromo,6 had established a harsh 
type of rule which degraded the bulk of the local inhabitants to the status of 
so-called gÃbbar, serfs of the state. The gÃbbar-system varied in certain de-
tails from province to province. Usually, a number of local families were 
attached to nÃfؾÃÐÐa (gun-men), soldiers mostly of Amharic origin, whom 
they had to supply with food and socage services. Only the traditional 
chiefs of the native peoples kept their positions as independent land-owners 
(balabbat). In order to maintain their privileges in this ߋquasi-feudalisticߌ 
structure they were expected to act as agents for the new political authority 
and were often alienated from their own groups.7 The Orthodox Church also 
benefited from grants it received for the purpose of usufruct (gwȸlt rights, 
called sÃmon in this special case) and was furthermore exempted from taxes. 
Although the annexation of the south was often glorified as an act of uni-
fication for modern Ethiopia, from the point of view of the subjected peo-
ples it was conceived and experienced as a type of colonialist expansion. It 
was frequently stated that the degree of oppression even exceeded Fascist 
imperialism in north-eastern Africa. Hatred against ߋAmharaߌ rule was 
therefore widespread and deep-rooted in the so-called dar agÃr, the con-
quered land. 
The areas in the south except the borderland with Somalia were not di-
rectly affected by the Italian invasion before January 1936, when the Ethio-
pian armies commanded by ras DÃsta DamؾÃw in Sidamo-Borana and 
dÃǆǆazmaì BÃyyÃnÃ MÃrȸd in Bale retreated northwards after disastrous 
defeats. They resisted in the highlands of the GÃnale and Wabi ĿÃbÃle 
headwaters until the beginning of 1937 and then moved to the lowlands of 
the Rift Valley.  
However, the situation had started to become precarious for the imperial 
government immediately after the mobilization of the garrisons from the 
 
5 Precise data are presented by Guida dell߈Africa Orientale Italiana 1938: 548. 
6 The oral traditions of the southern peoples mostly used ߋAmharaߌ as a collective label, 
but the term ߋHabÃŀaߌ seems to be more adequate to summarize all settlers from the 
Christian empire of Ethiopia. 
7 For details regarding the Hadiyya and neighbouring peoples of central-southern Ethi-
opia cf. BRAUK£MPER 1980, chapters 3.7.1 and 3.7.2. 
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southern provinces to positions in Tȸgray and Ogaden. For example, the 
forces of KÃmbata province numbering 30,000 soldiers, were brought into 
action on the northern front by governor MÃŀÃŀa WÃldÃ and put under the 
command of ras GetaììÃw AbatÃ.8 The local balabbat had to join the armed 
forces as fighters, and additionally, many natives were recruited as porters 
and servants. People remembered the misery and the casualties of this auxil-
iary personnel to have been extremely high, because it received less care and 
lower provisions than the combat troops. 
Following the considerable reduction of political control and military 
presence in their areas, the latent bitterness of the southerners quickly esca-
lated into a desire for rebellion and resistance. More or less spontaneous 
uprisings against the Ethiopian authorities started among the indigenous 
populations in the provinces of Gurage, KÃmbata, Arussi, Sidamo and Bale. 
Rebels of these peoples rose against those nÃfؾÃÐÐa reserves who kept the 
Ethiopian position mainly in the kÃtÃma, the towns and headquarters of the 
provinces. The nÃfؾÃÐÐa were technically superior due to their being 
equipped with rifles, but hopelessly outnumbered by the autochthonous 
peoples. However, because of hereditary animosities and divergent inter-
ests, interethnic wars broke out between the rebellious groups, who were 
thus unable to establish a united front of resistance. Consequently, it was 
easy for the nÃfؾÃÐÐa to win allies and to defend their position until the 
final occupation of the Rift Valley by Italian troops terminated the warlike 
clashes in April 1937. 
The market for weaponry was considerable and according to informants 
in southern Ethiopia old rifles of the Fusil gras type could already be pur-
chased in exchange of four sheep; modern Snyders and Remingtons were 
more expensive. However, firearms were in most cases accessible only to 
northern colonists and the balabbat, whereas the military equipment of 
local warriors was usually restricted to lances, spears, swords and shields. 
The voluminous literature on the ߋItalo-Abyssinianߌ war has commonly 
focused on the dramatic military actions involving the armies of the two 
nations. It has so far neglected the fact that simultaneously a civil war broke 
out in many parts of Ethiopia which considerably weakened the resistance 
of the defenders, and, at the same time, favoured the advance of the foreign 
aggressors. The confrontation between pro-Italian and anti-Italian factions 
caused a serious dividing line in the population of the country which con-
tinued to have a negative impact on political, social, economic and cultural 
co-existence for several decades after the liberation from colonial rule. It 
 
8 ULLENDORFF, The Autobiography of Emperor Haile Sellasie I (1976: 278f.). This was 
confirmed by my own oral records (BRAUK£MPER 1980: 354). 
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was honourable for Ethiopians to report actions of resistance against the 
foreign invaders as fighters in the war or as ߋpatriotsߌ (arbÃÐÐa) during the 
time of occupation. Collaborators with the Fascist European colonialists, 
presumably the majority of the inhabitants in the southern provinces, how-
ever, tended to be reluctant to talk about their experiences and deeds, be-
cause they considered themselves as historical losers and were also afraid of 
being exposed to sanctions.9 That is why information about pro-Italian atti-
tudes and actions has scarcely been documented in collections of oral tradi-
tions by foreign researchers as well as in literary contributions by Ethiopian 
authors.10 
In 1916, the imperial government had once been confronted with serious 
uprisings in the southern provinces when most of the military garrisons had 
marched to ĿÃwa in order to fight the supporters of Lȸǆ Iyasu Mikaʝel at 
SÃgÃle.11 It was therefore well aware of the danger of rebellion in this part of 
the country and took precautions to minimize the threat by reorganizing 
administrative units and territorial defence, by recruiting local militias and 
by fortifying the important kÃtÃma such as Hossana, Soddo/WÃlaytta, Yȸr-
ga ʞAlÃm, ؽiìo and Gobba. When reports of the Ethiopian disaster in the 
battle of May सÃw in Tȸgray (March 31 to April 3, 1936) reached the south-
ern provinces, violent opposition against ׶abÃŀa authority exploded and a 
year of incessant internal fighting started. For a short period in May, a polit-
ical entity labelled ߋWestern Galla Confederationߌ was founded among the 
western Oromo which unsuccessfully requested support from the British.12 
A large part of the population in central-southern Ethiopia openly sympa-
thised with the collapse of Ethiopian rule and looked forward to welcoming 
the foreign invaders as liberators. The situation of the rebels continued to be 
precarious, however, as long as remnants of the imperial army under ras 
DÃsta DamؾÃw operated in the Lake Region of the Rift Valley. These regu-
lar troops were able to integrate the ׶abÃŀa soldiers and the balabbat who 
fled back to their home areas after the collapse of the northern front. Their 
final destruction by Italian forces in eastern Gurage province in February 
and the occupation of Soddo/WÃlaytta in April 1937 terminated the period 
 
 9 This war confirmed by my own research experiences and also stated by HABERLAND 
1993: 215f. 
10 Reports by Ethiopian authors in this respect tend to be biased and one-sided, as for ex-
ample, the prominent one of HaylÃ Sellase I (ULLENDORFF 1976, chapters 34߃47). An 
important work in this field of studies has been contributed by K£BB£D£ T£S£MMA 
(1969/70: 394߃425) who, for example, extensively deals with the imperial decrees and the 
Ethio߃Italian negotiations. I am indebted to Bairu Tafla for this information. 
11 For details cf. BRAUK£MPER 1980: 326߃32 and map 26. 
12 Cf. EZEKIEL GEBISSA 2007. 
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of intensive fighting between regular troops, although the Pax Romana 
could never fully be established in this part of the country. 
The Hadiyya and the Arsi-Oromo were among the fiercest opponents to 
Ethiopian rule.13 Already during the Italian advance in the provinces of Bale 
and Sidamo, Arsi fighters had joined the invaders and subsequently sup-
ported them by guerrilla operations as well as in various battles, e.g. at 
Magalo, Sabirro, Gololìa, Lago, Arbegona, Sade, Goǆi and Yȸrga ʞAlÃm. 
Three Arsi leaders, Saymo Kimmo, Noho Daadi and WÃldÃ Mikaʝel Bui, 
were particularly mentioned in the oral traditions as allies of the Italians.14 
The ongoing decline of Ethiopian power incited the rebels to attack the 
nÃfؾÃÐÐa and their allies, at first in their scattered homesteads and then in 
their villages and towns. Brutality escalated to an extent that the rebels 
killed even the women and children of their adversaries, thus provoking 
counter-actions of a similar type. One of the few eyewitnesses who openly 
spoke of the battles and massacres of that time was my main Hadiyya in-
formant Nammana Dilliso who stated: ߋWe finished all the nÃfؾÃÐÐa with-
out any pity, and I am not afraid to confess this deedߌ. 
Generally, in reminiscences and oral reports the ߋtime of chaosߌ during 
the Italian occupation has therefore remained ambivalent in many respects. 
Protagonists involved in warlike actions mostly remembered it as a turbu-
lent, heroic time when the martial virtues and the ߋkilling systemߌ, i.e. a 
detailed scale of honorary rewards for the killing of human adversaries and 
dangerous animals, were revitalised. But people also recalled the time as a 
dark period of extraordinary cruelties and considered it inconvenient and 
possibly disadvantageous to speak of it. 
From May 1936 onwards, Ethiopian rule gradually collapsed also in those 
parts of the country which were not yet efficiently controlled by the Italian 
invaders. As already indicated, the situation was obviously worst in those 
regions of the Rift Valley between Gurageland and northern Sidamo Prov-
ince, where remnants of Ethiopian troops resisted until spring 1937. One of 
the latest positions to be occupied by the Italians was Soddo/WÃlaytta in 
April of the same year. 
 
13 The following data are mainly based on oral reports documented by local informants, 
particularly from the Hadiyya elder Nammana Dilliso (BRAUK£MPER 1980: 349߃57). Cf. 
BUSTORF 2009: 306߃09. According to a personal information which I received by PAUL 
BAXTER in 1979, his informants confessed that the Arsi-Oromo were ߋpro-Italian to a 
manߌ. 
14 BRAUK£MPER 1980: 349. Cf. GRAZIANI 1940: 232, 266, 306, 308; ZOLI 1937: 365߃67, 
maps XXII, XXIII. 
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The military actions during the second half of 1936 in the area inhabited 
by Arsi-Oromo can roughly be sketched as follows.15 The nÃfؾÃÐÐa were 
reinforced by imperial Ethiopian combatants under grazmaì ׼aylÃ  Bȸru 
who were retreating from the सÃrì̂Ãr mountains in a south-western direc-
tion. They beat a contingent of Arsi fighters led by fitawrari MÃlÃssa near 
Gobesa and drove them from the regions of Ŀirka and GÃdÃb towards the 
Wabi ĿÃbÃlle headwaters. NÃfؾÃÐÐa and loyal balabbat from the lowlands 
of the Rift Valley as well as the Gullallee, Christian ĿÃwa Oromo settlers in 
the Munesa region, partly took refuge in MÃlÃssa߈s stronghold. At the same 
time violent conflicts started between Arsi and Sidaama, longtime arch-
enemies, and occasionally also between Arsi clans, such as the Weege and 
Aboosa near the MÃqi river. The small ethnic group of the Zay took refuge 
from the turmoils on the islands of Lake Zway. The final occupation of the 
Arsi highlands by the Italians took place during the second half of 1936 
from the region of Nazret (Adaama). On their way to AsÃlla they met fierce 
resistance from remnants of Ethiopian forces near Huruta and therefore 
continued their southward advance east of the ëȸlalo massif. ؽiìo, the capital 
of Arsi province, was taken after heavy attacks by the Italian air force which 
employed poison gas. The remaining pockets of arbÃÐÐa fighters under 
fitawrari Dibaba and fitawrari Wabiìet surrendered in July in Arba-Gugu. 
In the western parts of the Rift Valley warlike activity continued. In Au-
gust 1936, dÃǆǆazmaì Balìa Ĺafo (Abba NÃfso) advanced from £ǆÃmǆa in 
northern Gurage province towards Addis AbÃba, but he was defeated and 
killed by the Italians at BÃììo.16 After their retreat from the highlands of 
Sidamo province, the remnants of ras DÃsta DÃmؾaw߈s troops had taken 
their last position on the eastern escarpment of the Gurage highlands. The 
local population of this area, the Islamic Sȸlؾe groups, formerly labelled East 
Gurage, were reputed to be particularly loyal to the emperor because of 
marriage links established with King ĹahlÃ Ĺȸllase of ĿÃwa (ruled 1813߃47). 
For a period of more than half a year, Sȸlؾeland continued to be a strong-
hold for the defence of the imperial Ethiopian position. The Sȸlؾe groups 
founded a ߋGogotߌ, a political alliance consisting of AzÃrnÃt-BÃrbÃre, 
Aliììo-Wuriro, Sȸlؾi and WȸlbarÃg-MÃlga, which was also joined by the 
Allaaba, MÃsqan and WÃlÃne-GÃdÃbano and parts of the SÃbat bet (seven 
 
15 The following data are based on oral records which I collected between 1970 and 1974 
(BRAUK£MPER 1980: 351߃57). 
16 BAIRU TAFLA 2003: 457. This event was still vividly remembered in the oral traditions 
of the Qabeena region in 1973. 
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houses) Gurage.17 Warriors of this federation, supported by nÃfؾÃÐÐa forc-
es, started invading the land of their hereditary enemies, the Libido-
Hadiyya west of Lake Zway in May 1936. On their southern flank they 
were assisted by Gurage fighters commanded by imam Sugato ZÃyni as well 
as by parts of the Allaaba. The Libido and Arsi, who could muster about 
1500 warriors equipped with rifles and another 3000 fighters carrying 
spears, were forced to retreat to the region between the rivers MÃqi and 
Awaŀ with their families and herds. Although they received reinforcements 
from the eastern highlands of Arsi, they could not return to their areas be-
fore the final Italian establishment of military and political control in May 
1937. In February they had sent a delegation headed by qÃÐÐazmaì 
Wooshebbe to the Italians in order to welcome them as liberators and to 
complain about their miserable situation as refugees. 
Apart from the Libido and the Arsi in the lowlands of the Rift Valley, 
the Gogot federation faced the Hadiyya subgroups Leemo, Shaashoogo, 
Sooro and Baadawwaachcho. The Shaashoogo were able to stop the advance 
of the Allaaba in the region of Aìe, and the ŭndÃgaÐ-Gurage paid a consid-
erable amount of tribute to imam Sugato in order to prevent him from 
plundering their area.18 
In Hossana, the capital of KÃmbata province, the deputy governor 
fitawrari Tamrat WÃlda SÃmayat had organized an efficient resistance 
against the Hadiyya rebels. He fortified the town, which had to shelter nu-
merous nÃfؾÃÐÐa refugees who had escaped the massacres escalating from 
May 1936 onwards. He sent special messengers to dÃǆǆazmaì MÃkwÃnnȸn 
WossÃne, the Ethiopian commander in Soddo/WÃlaytta, and to the Gogot 
federation headed by imam Sugato in order to coordinate the ׶abÃŀa de-
fence. The forces of the Sȸlؾe, however, were engaged in fighting the Arsi 
and Libido, and the positions of nafؾÃÐÐa and their native allies in WÃlaytta 
were threatened by attacks of the Baadawwaachcho-Hadiyya and Sidaama. 
The Leemo-Hadiyya supported by Kambaata warriors overran most of 
Hossana, but they were unable to take the strongly fortified gȸbbi, the ad-
ministrative headquarters. However, the defenders were superior in their 
equipment of rifles and even possessed some machine guns. Following the 
first shock of their retreat, they counterattacked, drove the rebels south-
wards to the area of the Sooro-Hadiyya and took revenge by merciless raid-
ing and plundering. At the same time, in May 1936, the Baadawwaachcho 
 
17 The oral records collected by BUSTORF (2009: 289߃93) have considerably enlarged the 
knowledge about the time of Italian rule among the Sȸlؾe and completed my own data 
(BRAUK£MPER 1980: 353f.). 
18 Oral information recorded by BUSTORF (2009: 291). 
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had invaded WÃlaytta and forced their adversaries to take refuge behind the 
palisades of Soddo kÃtÃma. After the WÃlaytta, arch-enemies of the Hadiy-
ya, had hastily mobilized their warriors and joined the nafؾÃÐÐa forces, 
MÃkwÃnnȸn led a counteroffensive in June. He took up position in the 
southern foothills of Ambariììo massif, whereas fitawrari Tamrat ap-
proached from the north. The two commanders obviously planned to de-
stroy the rebels in a concerted pincer movement, but this action was not 
efficiently coordinated. The Hadiyya concentrated their attack on Tamrat߈s 
troops and pushed them back before MÃkwÃnnȸn was able to join the battle. 
Most of the nafؾÃÐÐa forces retreated to Hossana. The Hadiyya warriors 
abstained from pursuing them in order to stop the advance of the Gogot 
federation in the northeast of their territory.19 
Despite their occasional military successes, it was unquestionable for the 
rebellious Hadiyya and Kambaata that their situation should become in-
creasingly hopeless during the second half of 1936. They were therefore 
anxiously looking forward to the advance of the Italian troops in the Rift 
Valley. In October, remnants of nafؾÃÐÐa from Sidamo province reinforced 
the imperial combatants in WÃlaytta20, and the Gogot federation of the Sȸlؾe 
and the Gurage invaded the northern parts of KÃmbata province. Many 
semi-nomadic Hadiyya managed to preserve their existence by moving to 
remote and malaria-stricken lowland regions with their herds. The Kambaa-
ta peasants were less mobile, and therefore more vulnerable and exposed to 
the plundering of their means of existence. According to eyewitnesses and 
orally recorded memories, excessive killing of people, quite often including 
women and children, burning of houses as well as destruction and theft of 
property occurred. It was obviously the most chaotic and cruel time the 
inhabitants of these areas had ever experienced. In this hopeless situation 
the Baadawwaachcho sent delegates to dÃǆǆazmaì MÃkwÃnnȸn to declare 
their surrender and were then forced to support his campaign against other 
Hadiyya subgroups and pockets of resistance among the Kambaata. They 
are said to have silently agreed that women and children of their own 
tribesmen should never be harmed during these military operations. 
After the nafؾÃÐÐa and their allies had gained control in most of 
KÃmbata province, they moved eastwards in order to fight the anti-imperial 
forces in western Arsiland and to support the remnants of DÃsta DamؾÃw߈s 
army which were retreating northwards from the Sidaama highlands. In this 
 
19 Numerous names of commanders and successful warriors as well as details of warlike 
actions were remembered by the informants (cf. BRAUK£MPER 1980: 354߃57; BUSTORF 
2009: 290f.). To mention all of them is beyond the scope of this article. 
20 DAVIS 1972: 96; GIACCARDI 1937: 1555. 
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situation of temporary superiority, they decided to destroy once and for all 
the obstinate Hadiyya groups, particularly the Baadawwaachcho, who, in 
turn, prepared themselves for a last desperate fight. But they were saved, 
because in January 1937, the first columns of Italian soldiers arrived in the 
region of the upper Bilate from the north as well as from the south. Sup-
ported by bombardment by their air force, they overcame the fierce re-
sistance of the imperial troops and pursued their scattered remnants. Hos-
sana surrendered on February 11, and Soddo/WÃlaytta on April 4.21 
Fitawrari Tamrat fell in action, but his brother kept up resistance in the 
gorge of the upper Gibe (Omo) for some time. According to oral sources, a 
small group of Amhara patriots under the leadership of AsfÃha resisted the 
new colonial rulers in that remote area until the return of ׼aylÃ Ĺȸllase in 
1941. The situation of the arbÃÐÐa, who had to adapt themselves to guerril-
la tactics, was particularly dangerous in southern Ethiopia, where the Italian 
colonialists enjoyed a notable amount of sympathy and active collaboration 
from a large part of the population. 
Principles, practices and effects of Italian colonial rule 
Through the occupation of Ethiopia Italy had realized her dream of an East 
African colonial empire. Resistance against the new rulers, however, re-
mained omnipresent, and was most efficiently counteracted by a policy of 
ߋdivide et imperaߌ. Fascist ideology favoured brutal suppression of colonial 
subjects, which was practiced particularly during the administration of vice-
roy Rodolfo Graziani (1936߃37). Italian rule was also characterized by an 
outstanding amount of bureaucracy and corruption.22  
According to the new administrative division of Africa Orientale Italiana, 
the peoples of central-southern Ethiopia, with the exception of the Somali, 
were placed under the governorates, large multi-ethnic territorial clusters, of 
Galla e Sidama (with the capital ǅimma) and Harar. The eastern Oromo and 
most of the Arsi were ascribed to Harar obviously because of their Islamic 
orientation. This was one of the reasons why the administrative system was 
affected by serious problems in the two neighbouring governorates concern-
ing regional boundaries. The Arsi on their western borderland, for example, 
initially refused to cooperate with the government and pay taxes, before an 
agreement was reached in 1939.23 At a lower level, the Italians hardly changed 
the territorial divisions and structures and mostly adopted the existing places 
 
21 Cf. Guida dell߈Africa Italiana 1938: 548. 
22 SBACCHI 1985: 80, 85ff.; PERHAM 1969: 372. 
23 Cf. SBACCHI 1985: 92f. 
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of residence such as ؽiìo, Gobba, Hossana and Soddo/WÃlaytta.24 However, 
they almost completely removed the administrative personnel of the imperial 
regime, a measure highly welcomed by the majority of the inhabitants in 
southern Ethiopia. The new masters benefited from the deep-rooted hatred 
against the ׶abÃŀa governors and landlords and enjoyed much loyalty from 
the newly established chiefs. Local dignitaries, who eagerly collaborated, were 
granted privileges and titles. Sugato ZÃyni, for example, the leader of the Sȸlؾe 
Gogot, was appointed capo dei Guraghe Orientali and received special au-
thority and military equipment including modern machine guns in order to 
fight rebellious ߋŀȸftaߌ.25 The balabbat and descendent of the royal dynasty in 
Kambaata, Barganno Mooliso, managed to become an esteemed counsellor of 
the Italian resident and exploited this position for the benefit of his own fami-
ly and his group.26 With regard to honorary titles, the Italians maintained the 
existing Amharic versions, but occasionally they also awarded titles of a local 
cultural or Muslim background. Usually, they also paid salaries to the collab-
orating members of the traditional nobility according to their respective 
ranks.27 Although the principles of indirect rule contradicted the racist and 
totalitarian ideology of Fascist colonialism, they were nevertheless employed 
for pragmatic reasons to a noteworthy extent. 
The most important change brought about by the foreign occupants in 
southern Ethiopia was the abolition of the gÃbbar system, which was de-
clared to be totally inconsistent with occidental civilization. The peasants 
were not only exempted from the hitherto heavy tribute and socage services 
to their landlords, but received possessory titles to the land which they had 
tilled. However, the Italian administration abstained from the difficult task 
of surveying, reorganizing and redistributing landownership. Apart from 
the expulsion of nÃfؾÃÐÐa, it hardly interfered in the status quo of the actu-
ally existing settlement patterns of ethnic groups. Peasants from Kambaata, 
Sȸlؾe and Gurage, for example, who had looked for a living in nÃfؾÃÐÐa fiefs 
in the thinly populated grazing areas of semi-nomadic Hadiyya and Arsi 
were permitted to stay there. Likewise, Sidaama and Gedeʝo settlers were 
able to remain on their agricultural plots in Guǆǆiland, where they were, 
however, permanently exposed to the danger of attacks from the bellicose 
Guǆǆi nomads. As a rule, colonial governments considered sedentary peas-
ants as more controllable and more productive than mobile herdsmen. The 
 
24 The Guida dell߈Africa Orientale Italiana (1938: 461,464, 548f., 555, 557) presents 
demographic data for most of these places. 
25 BUSTORF 2009: 311. 
26 BRAUK£MPER 1983: 109; BRAUK£MPER 1980: 361. 
27 Cf. SBACCHI 1985: 136f., 150, 152f. 
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fixation of the Italian tax rate to the paying of tithe and an annual per capita 
tax of one Maria Theresa thaler for cattle was gratefully welcomed by the 
rural population as a considerable reduction of their fiscal burden.28 
The persistence of slavery in Ethiopia ߃ despite various attempts by 
Mȸnilȸk and ׼aylÃ Ĺȸllase to ban it ߃ had provided a basic justification for 
the Italians to occupy the country in order to bring about global standards 
of a humanitarian civilization. The rigorous abolition of the slave trade and 
all forms of slavery therefore possessed such a high priority that Graziani 
already proclaimed a general liberation of slaves on February 27, 1936, i.e. 
long before the end of the military operations.29 Hadiyya informants re-
ported that the colonial administration succeeded in abolishing slavery 
quickly because of efficient means of control and draconian punishments. A 
considerable number of people who had been kidnapped and deported to 
other areas were enabled to return to their places of origin.30 However, dur-
ing their short period of occupation, the Italians were unable to achieve 
complete emancipation of the former slaves which would have included 
assignment of land to them. In some areas of southern Ethiopia the percent-
age of slaves was so high, in WÃlaytta, for example, it amounted to approx-
imately one fourth of the population, that insuperable logistical problems 
arose. The majority of freeborn people were not too eager to give up their 
socio-economic privileges and share their resources. Therefore, their will-
ingness to cooperate in order to grant benefits to the former slaves was lim-
ited. Some of the freed individuals found an economic niche working as 
blacksmiths, a profession which was not prestigious, but which did not put 
them on the same level as the culturally marginalized castes of the potters, 
woodworkers and tanners. According to my own observations, slave origin 
was still clearly remembered among many groups of southern Ethiopia in 
the 1970s, and the most blatant disparities regarding access to means of pro-
duction by ex-slaves and marginalized craftworkers were obviously not 
overcome before the land reform of 1975. 
The Italian colonialists considered it as one of their highest priorities to 
construct a road system of a projected length of more than 6000 miles in 
order to foster economic development. Roads were desperately needed to 
facilitate transport of goods to towns and market places as well as efficient 
military control. The local governors and chiefs had to provide manpower, 
 
28 BRAUK£MPER 1980: 358. For information regarding the system of taxation cf. also 
MAHTEME SELASSIE WOLDE MASKAL 1957. 
29 GRAZIANI 1940: 307; PERHAM 1969: 232. 
30 Concrete cases were recorded, for example, from the Dizi by HABERLAND (1993: 213߃
15). Cf. also AMBORN 2006: 1߃28. 
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and the necessity of mustering workers became a steady source of conflict. 
Obviously, forced labour for projects of infrastructure painfully reminded 
people in southern Ethiopia of the socage services and of their former status 
as gÃbbar. Regarding the lack of enthusiasm the Arsi-Oromo demonstrated 
for the task of road construction, the Italian officer Giorgio Cannonieri 
angrily complained as follows: ߋBut the Arussi consider themselves as big 
masters, a race superior to the petty farmers, as great cattle keepers, as hunt-
ers of big game who oppose accepting lower worksߌ (my translation).31 
Oral traditions refer to a number of agricultural innovations which 
spread during the Italian occupation. The cultivation of red pepper and 
cotton expanded in the lowlands of the Rift Valley, bananas were intro-
duced from ǅimma to regions west of the Omo and the production of cof-
fee was sponsored to become the major cash crop of many highland areas. 
The Hadiyya remember the introduction of a special type of maize which 
became known as ߋtalianŀ bokolloߌ. The European colonialists showed less 
interest, however, in the improvement of animal husbandry.32 
People in southern Ethiopia were not confronted with a noteworthy in-
flux of colonizing settlers from Italy as occurred in Eritrea. In the rural 
areas of the governorates Galla e Sidama and Harar obviously not more 
than some hundred Europeans were active as traders or farmers, for exam-
ple in the fertile coffee producing areas of Arba Gugu, where they benefited 
from the programmes of the SociÈtÈ des Plantations d߈Abyssinie. Colonizing 
schemes, including financial compensation to the local landowners, were 
planned, but not realized, in the region of AsÃlla in western Arsiland.33 
Contacts of whatever kind between the indigenous inhabitants and Europe-
an settler colonists are hardly recorded or remembered in the oral tradi-
tions. A prominent exception was Hermann GÕtz, a German farmer in 
Adami Tullu on the southern shore of Lake Zway, whom I personally met 
on March 30, 1970, five months before his death. He had experienced leg-
endary conflicts with the local Arsi as well as precarious relations with the 
Italians and with the imperial Ethiopian government between 1937 and 
1943. 
The Fascist education system for Italian East Africa (defined in July 
1936) provided two types of schools: one according to the metropolitan 
model and another one for the ߋcolonial subjectsߌ, where teaching in some 
local languages such as ߋGallinyaߌ (Oromo) was introduced in order to 
 
31 CANNONIERI 1937: 14. 
32 For further details cf. BRAUK£MPER 1980: 361. 
33 SBACCHI 1985: 104f.; BRAUK£MPER 1980: 363f. As a general overview see also 
PODEST 2007: 59߃84. 
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reduce the importance of Amharic.34 In rural areas, even the latter was ac-
cessible only for an imperceptible minority of people. Educational facilities 
established by European missionaries from the late 1920s onwards were 
critically supervised by the Italian authorities. Last but not least because of 
Mussolini߈s Lateran Treaty of 1929 with the Vatican the activities of Roman 
Catholic missionaries were not only tolerated but to some extent spon-
sored. Many of their Protestant colleagues, however, saw themselves ex-
posed to various measures of oppression. In WÃlaytta, KÃmbata and parts of 
WÃllÃgga they were often suspected of sympathizing with the imperial gov-
ernment and occasionally expelled.35  
Officially, respect and freedom for all religions was guaranteed according 
to the Italian constitution. From the very beginning of their rule, however, 
the Italian authorities showed greater support for Islam than for the Chris-
tian religion. This fact which mainly became relevant for south-eastern 
Ethiopia, where Islam dominated, can be explained by Italy߈s opportunistic 
policy of ߋdivide and ruleߌ. The Christian ׶abÃŀa suffered most from the 
new regime, particularly because they lost their leading position in the 
southern provinces and therefore acted as the most stubborn defenders of 
the preceding governmental system. The Orthodox Church was suspected 
of being at the heart of patriotic spirit and nationalist opposition against the 
foreign invaders and was consequently subjected to extremely harsh 
measures of suppression. Atrocities ordered by viceroy Graziani culminated 
in the murdering of approximately 1500 priests and monks between March 
and July 1937.36 
Present-day Ethiopian Muslims are reluctant to acknowledge the massive 
support Islam enjoyed at the time of the Italian occupation and the collabo-
ration of their ancestors with the Fascist colonialists. This view became 
obvious, as I myself observed, during the discussions at the conference 
ߋCross and Crescent ߃ Christian߃Muslim Relations in Ethiopiaߌ which 
took place at the German Cultural Institute in Addis AbÃba in September 
2002. In any case, the scholarly interpretation has to be confronted with the 
evidence of historical facts.  
It was by no means because of a special appreciation of Islam but for 
pragmatic reasons that Italy pursued a pro-Muslim policy in her colonies. In 
a well-known speech which Benito Mussolini delivered in the Libyan capi-
tal Tripoli in 1937, he addressed his colonial subjects as follows: ߋFascist 
Italy intends to guarantee to the Muslim peoples of Libya and Ethiopia 
 
34 MINISTERIO DELLE COLONIE (ITALIA) 1936: 608, cf. 315. 
35 DAVIS 1972: 122ff.; BRAUK£MPER 1980: 363; Cf. PANKHURST 1972: 363f., 374. 
36 SBACCHI 1985: 194. 
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peace, justice, prosperity, respect for the laws of the Prophet, and wishes 
moreover to manifest its sympathy with Islam and the Muslims of the entire 
worldߌ.37 Some years before, the Italians had fought Muslim freedom fight-
ers in their Libyan colony with utmost brutality, even employing poison 
gas to a large extent. 
Italy߈s pro-Islamic propaganda and policy was obviously successful. 
Many Muslims seem to have welcomed the Italo߃Ethiopian war as a God-
sent opportunity to declare a ǆihad, a holy war, against the ׶abÃŀa, who 
had marginalized and suppressed them. In Gurageland, Muslims are be-
lieved to have exalted the Italian victory as a military triumph of Islam.38 
The Italians massively supported the construction of stone-built mosques 
which had hardly existed before, and sponsored ߋhigher schoolsߌ of Islamic 
instruction, including a centre for Muslim theology and jurisprudence at 
ǅimma. Qoranic teachers and qadis were appointed in administrative head-
quarters such as ؽiìo, Robe, Adoola and Gobba, from where the Muslim 
religion started expanding among the western Arsi.39 In Burǆi, Islam gained 
a notable foothold during the late 1930s.40 The Italians also favoured Islam 
as a kind of ߋcivilizing factorߌ, because the Muslims rejected ߋpaganߌ rules 
and value concepts which disturbed the public order, such as the killing 
obligations prescribed by the widely distributed age-class system generally 
labelled gadaa. The colonial masters recruited their askaris, native soldiers, 
and irregulars, so-called banda irregolare, mainly from Muslim groups, 
assuming their particular loyalty because of their often deep-rooted antipa-
thy towards ׶abÃŀa Christians. However, not all Muslims were by far de-
cidedly pro-Italian. Detailed cases of war crimes carried out by the Fascist 
colonialists against Muslims and of courageous resistance against them were 
recorded, for example, by Bustorf in Sȸlؾe.41 
The collapse of Italian rule and Ethiopian restoration  
Colonial rule in Ethiopia rapidly collapsed after Italy had entered World 
War II on June 10, 1940. Troops of the British Commonwealth, supported 
by Ethiopian arbÃÐÐa, invaded Italian East Africa from Kenya and the An-
glo߃Egyptian Sudan and entered Addis AbÃba on April 6, 1941. Within the 
 
37 BERTOLA (1939: 162) quoted in TRIMINGHAM (1965: 137). 
38 This was stated by SBACCHI (1985: 162) in a rather general context. Precise data would 
be desirable. 
39 TRIMINGHAM 1965: 137, 184f., 204; BRAUK£MPER 2004: 159f.; PERHAM 1969: 123, 249; 
BUSTORF 2009: 253f., 320; ·STEB· 2008: 128f. 
40 AMBORN 2009: 34, 289f.; Personal communication by Helmut Straube in 1973. 
41 BUSTORF 2009: 312f. 
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next two months, the allied forces occupied most of the provinces of Harar 
and Galla e Sidama, and on November 27 the Italian vice-roy Amadeo di 
Savoia-Aosta surrendered in his last stronghold at GondÃr.42 Because of the 
rapid advance of the British troops and the lack of resolute Italian re-
sistance, the consequences for the civilian population in terms of casualties 
and destruction of property were obviously less dramatic than during the 
military actions of 1935߃37. The oral traditions of people in central-
southern Ethiopia, which I recorded, nevertheless remember the period of 
ߋre-conquestߌ as a time of extreme hardship, violence and economic misery 
which continued until 1943.43  
The situation in many parts of southern Ethiopia was to some extent simi-
lar to the period of Italian conquest, i.e. it was characterized by a breakdown 
of public order, political anarchy and the turbulence of interethnic warfare. It 
was tragic for the local ethnic groups that they were involved as auxiliaries on 
both sides, however, with very different options and aspirations. Collabora-
tors of the Italians wanted to escape from negative sanctions by retreating 
with them. Supporters of the British, believing them to be the stronger party, 
on the other hand looked forward to profiting from a successful conquest. On 
their retreat towards ǅimma the Italians confiscated much livestock and thus 
provoked hatred among the affected people, particularly Hadiyya, Kambaata, 
Gurage and western Oromo. The British military commanders did their best 
to exploit the growing opposition against the Italians and appealed to the 
leaders of indigenous groups to join the forces of re-conquest. My informants 
reported that a direct involvement of local people in battles of this ߋwar of the 
FÃrÃnǆߌ, the Europeans, was limited, but interethnic conflicts in many areas 
again reached a state of extraordinary intensity. Some examples may be men-
tioned: Contingents of ߋbandasߌ equipped with rifles terrorized and looted 
regions in WÃlaytta, Hadiyya and Allaaba. MÃsqan fighters attacked the Libi-
do and western Arsi. The territory of the Qabeena was invaded by warriors 
from सÃboo and Mu׽ȸr. ߋHereditaryߌ enemies such as Hadiyya and 
WÃlaytta clashed once again. Booranaland was raided by the Guǆǆi and Soma-
li. The Sidaama and Burǆi stubbornly resisted the restitution of ׶abÃŀa au-
thority and the situation in Ogaden got completely out of control.44 Settle-
ments of liberated and partly repatriated slaves, in particular, seem to have 
been exposed to excessive plundering. Margery Perham (1969: 362) stated: ߋIn 
1942߃3 the situation there became very out of hand. The British had been 
 
42 DEL BOCA 1969, chapter 20; ABYSSINIAN CAMPAIGNS 1942: 124, 126, 128, 134, 136ff. 
43 BRAUK£MPER 1980: 364߃68; Cf. BUSTORF 2009, chapter 7.3. 
44 BRAUK£MPER 1980: 365߃68; HABERLAND 1963: 29, 279; JENSEN 1959: 26; PERHAM 
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holding this region as far north as Negelli, and upon their withdrawing the 
Ethiopian Government sent in a very ill-chosen governor with some irregular 
levies who badly misbehaved themselvesߑ The still untamed Arusi Galla 
took to raiding and some detribalized Somali enjoyed themselves in their own 
wayߌ. 
By 1944, the worst period of chaos was overcome and replaced by a new 
era of Pax Aethiopica. Measures of revenge by the imperial government 
after ׼aylÃ Ĺȸllase߈s return from exile were remarkably modest. The pun-
ishment of ethnic groups such as the Hadiyya, Sidaama and Arsi-Oromo, 
who had intensively supported the Italians and were responsible for much 
bloodshed among the nÃfؾÃÐÐa, was usually restricted to confiscation of 
livestock. The bulk of the balabbat were not replaced and even prominent 
representatives of the old elite, who had collaborated with the Italians, such 
as for example ras GetaììÃw AbatÃ or sultan Abbaa ǅoobir of ǅimma, 
received mild sanctions. Despite the bitter memories regarding the atrocities 
during the war of conquest and the period of Rodolfo Graziani߈s rule, the 
Italian prisoners of war and colonial settlers were mostly treated fairly. Ob-
viously, the Emperor pursued a pragmatic policy aiming at two major goals: 
first, to avoid widespread reprisals accompanied by highly disagreeable 
demands for exposures and sanctions, and second, to achieve a far-reaching 
amnesty as well as an institutional restoration including as much continuity 
of administrative staff as possible. In fact, these strategies seem to have been 
the most promising means of pacifying the country after the brief but high-
ly turbulent intermezzo of colonial occupation. 
In the socio-economic sector the Ethiopian government was mainly con-
fronted with the necessity to find an adequate response to the abolition of 
slavery and the gÃbbar system by the Italians. The existence of these institu-
tions had indeed fuelled the Fascist propaganda, portraying Ethiopia as a 
barbaric state and as an anachronism in the modern world. In one of his 
first administrative acts in 1941, ׼aylÃ Ĺȸllase therefore issued a statement 
declaring the abolishment of slavery and the gÃbbar system. Respective laws 
were approved, but at the same time a new problem entailing serious conse-
quences arose. The government now started allocating large plots of land in 
the southern provinces to persons who had loyally defended the emperor߈s 
position. Rights of usufruct were thus abolished and replaced by a new legal 
status of landowners who could derive high profits from their tenants. It 
can hardly be doubted that this new type of socio-economic inequality be-
came a primary reason for the Ethiopian Revolution of 1974.45 ׼aylÃ 
Ĺȸllase failed in another important challenge to realize basic reforms in his 
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country. Efforts to improve the socio-political, economic and cultural 
emancipation of Muslims almost remained inexistent; a modest promotion 
of the condition of Islam was not achieved before the DÃrg regime.46 
Conclusions 
Any assessment of Italian colonialism in Ethiopia will be biased to some 
extent, depending on whether it is done by citizens of the north or the 
south of the country, by Christians or by Muslims, by Ethiopians or by 
foreigners. There is no doubt whatsoever that any type of colonialism is to 
be ethically and morally rejected as a system based on principles of socio-
economic inequality and more or less deep-rooted racist and cultural preju-
dices. The heroic resistance of their poorly equipped army against the by far 
technically superior European invaders is a fact any Ethiopian can be proud 
of. Another reason for pride is the struggle of the arbÃÐÐa, who prevented 
the Italians from gaining control over vast parts of the country including a 
number of mountainous pockets in the south.47 Many Ethiopians are there-
fore convinced that their country has never really been forced under a colo-
nial yoke and that the survival of its independence was principally uninter-
rupted. The five years of Italian occupation are thus assumed to have been a 
marginal episode which can hardly reduce Ethiopia߈s reputation as a potent 
bulwark of anti-colonial resistance in Africa.  
Views of this kind are obviously essential for the dominant discourse on 
modern Ethiopian history. Yet, there has always been another type of dis-
course which reflects the particular situation of the inhabitants in southern 
Ethiopia. As already pointed out, ׶abÃŀa rule was regarded in the dar agÃr 
as a particularly harsh type of heteronomy which may also be labelled ߋen-
do-colonialismߌ. Paradoxical as it may seem, foreign Fascist occupants were 
welcomed as liberators by a large part of the population. This view was 
quite often confessed to me in bitter remarks by informants in the Hadiyya-
Sidaama, Arsi and सÃr৶Ãr regions, who often labelled their former Ethiopi-
an masters as ߋbloodsuckersߌ. Repeatedly, I even came across the curious 
statement that ߋduring the Italian time there was always enough rain and no 
droughtߌ. However, as already indicated before, in mainstream historio-
graphy this fact has so far not been sufficiently analysed from the emic per-
spective of Ethiopian scholars. Likewise, their foreign counterparts are re-
luctant to tackle this sensitive issue from the etic point of view. First-hand 
information has usually only been gathered by cultural anthropologists 
 
46 HUSSEIN AHMAD 1994: 778߃91; BRAUK£MPER 2004: 5. 
47 A scholarly revision of arbÃÐÐa activities was recently presented by AREGAWI BERHE 
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working in their field research at the grassroots level of ethnic groups in the 
south. Among the Sȸlؾe, for example, and this fact can most probably be 
assumed for the majority of groups (or ߋnationalitiesߌ) in the south, the 
modern political discourse is dominated by topics such as the search for a 
newly defined identity and territorial shape in the context of ߋethnic feder-
alismߌ followed by the present government.48 For this purpose, arguments 
derived from all kinds of historical and ethnographic facts are eagerly ex-
ploited. 
Primary source materials on the events and effects of Italian colonialism 
can still be documented from oral traditions of the present generation, al-
though this possibility is dramatically dwindling. Intensified investigations of 
archival materials, particularly in Italy, seem to be promising as well. 
The postcolonialist approach as an attempt to achieve a globalization of 
cultural discourses that work to abolish distinctions between centre and 
periphery refers to Ethiopia in a twofold manner. First, it has to deal with 
the particular situation, probably unique in Africa, of an ߋendo-colonialistߌ 
antagonism between the north and the south of the country which persisted 
almost up to the end of the 20th century. Secondly, it has to analyse the 
structures and consequences caused by Italian colonial rule. These were not 
negligible, but due to the brief period of foreign occupation not very far-
reaching. No significant changes in the composition of the political elites 
occurred, for example. Processes such as the formation of new ethnic unities 
and the (re)invention of traditions, which became important fields of studies 
in many parts of postcolonial Africa, have not been distinctively recorded. 
In all these respects, Ethiopia before the revolution of 1974 seems to have 
been characterized by a high amount of stability and continuity. 
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Summary 
The present focus on ߋpostcolonial studiesߌ in cultural anthropology is attributing a grow-
ing interest to the Italian occupation in Ethiopia (1935߃1941). Whereas a considerable 
amount of ߋmainstreamߌ information has been collected about the war of conquest and 
colonial rule by Fascist Italy, the indigenous views and attitudes at the grassroots of the 
Ethiopian people have largely remained outside consideration. Because of the harsh exploi-
tation by the ruling elites of the empire, large parts of the inhabitants in the south readily 
collaborated with the foreign occupants. Resistance against the Italians could most efficient-
ly be counteracted by a policy of ߋdivide and ruleߌ. Although the effects of Italian occupa-
tion are a sensitive issue of research involving highly controversial views and emotions, it 
seems to be due time now to approach it in an unbiased scholarly discourse. 
